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POLITICS AND THE COURTROOM: 
A BATTLE BETWEEN FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 24 AND AMICUS CURIAE BRIEFS 
INTRODUCTION 
On May 15, 2018, The Honorable Andrew S. Hanen for the Southern 
District of Texas ruled that a group of twenty-two Dreamers 1  could 
intervene in a lawsuit brought by the State of Texas seeking an end to the 
2012 DACA program implemented by former President Barack Obama.2 
This decision is one of the most recent in a series of court decisions 
granting groups of both documented and undocumented immigrants 
original litigant status in cases challenging the validity of immigration 
policies.3 
Immigration intervention motions represent a novel manipulation of a 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) that was originally intended to 
cover absentee claims in real property disputes. 4  FRCP 24 (Rule 24) 
governs third-party intervention into a lawsuit and permits parties to 
participate in a suit as if they were original litigants.5 Given that Rule 24 
treats third parties as original litigants, it was originally one of the more 
restrictive FRCPs.6  Recent court decisions, however, have lowered the 
Rule 24 burden to intervene.7 Although Rule 24 provides a mechanism for 
ideological social justice movements and political speech to be heard in 
court,8 the ease with which third parties can now intervene has caused 
Rule 24 to clash with the long-standing doctrines of standing, class 
actions, jurisdiction, and res judicata.9 Such politico-ideological advocacy 
 
1. The term “Dreamers” refers to individuals who would have qualified for permanent legal 
status in the United States under the proposed Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors 
Act (DREAM Act). The DREAM Act failed to pass, but one purpose of the Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program was to provide relief to Dreamers. See The Initial DREAM Act 
S.1291 (2001), LAWLOGIX (July 29, 2013), https://www.lawlogix.com/what-is-the-dream-act-and-who 
-are-dreamers/ [https://perma.cc/PMA7-F4MJ]. 
2. Telephonic Conference Before the Honorable Andrew S. Hanen, Texas v. United States, 
No. 1:18-CV-68 (S.D. Tex. May 15, 2018), ECF No. 34 (defined as Texas II, see infra note 200); 
Julián Aguilar, Judge Allows Group of “Dreamers” to Formally Fight Texas’ Lawsuit to End DACA, 
TEX. TRIB. (May 15, 2018, 3:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2018/05/15/judge-allows-group-dr 
eamers-formally-fight-texas-lawsuit-end-daca/ [https://perma.cc/R75Q-6G7E]. 
3. See infra Section IV.A. 
4. See infra Section I.A. 
5. See sources cited infra note 24. 
6. See text accompanying and sources cited infra notes 33, 35, 37. 
7. See infra Part III. 
8. See infra Part III. 
9. See Res Judicata, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“An affirmative defense 
barring the same parties from litigating a second lawsuit on the same claim, or any other claim arising 











was previously reserved for amicus curiae10 briefs, in which the writing 
amicus or “friend of the court”11 is not treated as an original litigant, has 
no legally-recognized stake in the case, and does not risk interfering with 
other doctrines.12 
In addition to its recently lowered burden, Rule 24 intervention is 
especially important in the wake of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc.13 In Town of Chester, the Court 
held that an intervenor does not need independent Article III standing if 
she seeks the same relief as an original litigant.14 In social justice cases,15 
such as immigration actions, that relief is generally simple: upholding or 
overturning the validity of certain state or federal laws.16 Thus, because a 
social justice intervenor is more likely to seek the same relief as an 
original litigant than in other categories of cases,17 the Court’s removal of 
an independent standing requirement increased even more the likelihood 
of mass intervention by intervenors in social justice cases. 
This Note argues that courts have recently construed the scope of Rule 
24’s “significantly protectable interest” and “adequacy of representation” 
burden18 too broadly. Part I looks at the original purpose of Rule 24—to 
cover absentee claims in real property disputes—and its subsequent 
textually and judicially defined burden. Part II examines the reasons why 
Rule 24 is an attractive option for litigants. Part III discusses courts’ 
lowering of the burden in the social justice context. Part IV focuses on the 
increasing politicization and debate-style uses of Rule 24 through the lens 
of immigration actions. Part V analyzes the negative implications of the 
 
from the same transaction or series of transactions and that could have been—but was not—raised in 
the first suit.”). 
10. See Amicus Curiae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“Someone who is not a 
party to a lawsuit but who petitions the court or is requested by the court to file a brief in the action 
because that person has a strong interest in the subject matter.”). 
11. Id. 
12. See infra Section II.A. 
13. 137 S. Ct. 1645 (2017). 
14. Id. at 1648. 
15. “‘Social justice’ or ‘cause’ lawyering refers to the use of law and legal strategies to achieve 
community advancement objectives.” Faith Rivers James, Leadership and Social Justice Lawyering, 
52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 971, 972 (2012). This Note uses the term “social justice” interchangeably 
with “public interest.” See id. at 973–74. 
16. See JON GREENBAUM, LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, TOWARD A 
MORE JUST JUSTICE SYSTEM: HOW OPEN ARE THE COURTS TO SOCIAL JUSTICE LITIGATION? 1, 23 
(2016), https://lawyerscommittee.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Toward-A-More-Just-Justice-Syste 
m.pdf [https://perma.cc/U77Y-YZ9R]. 
17. See Justin P. Gunter, Note, Dual Standards for Third-Party Intervenors: Distinguishing 
Between Public-Law and Private-Law Intervention, 66 VAND. L. REV. 645, 648 (2013) (discussing 
“social reform” laws brought on by progressivism in the twentieth century, which have created specific 
“social reform” causes of action and remedies for public interest plaintiffs and expanded the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts).  












lowered Rule 24 burden and the Court’s decision in Town of Chester on 
other carefully crafted doctrines: standing, class actions, jurisdiction, and 
res judicata.  
Part V concludes by arguing that courts should tighten the Rule 24 
burden and reserve such politico-ideological advocacy, particularly when 
the relief sought is the same as that of the original parties, for its 
traditional forum: amicus briefs. If courts do not tighten the burden, they 
will face endless contentious public interest intervention motions that 
crowd the stage of the original litigation.19  With the lowered Rule 24 
burden, litigants have sought intervention on massive scales.20  Massive 
scale intervention is demonstrated by both the quantity of motions to 
intervene that are filed generally and within a given litigation, as well as 
by the quantity of intervenors seeking intervention under any one 
motion. 21  Both the relief intervenors seek as well as court decisions 
themselves have become too politico-ideological despite the efficiency 
afforded by having all interested voices present.22 Intervention at this scale 
is no longer practical.23  
I. IMPLEMENTATION AND PROCEDURAL FUNCTION OF RULE 24 
Rule 24, adopted in 1938, was written to replace Former Equity Rule 
37 of the Federal Equity Rules for claims in equity and varying state 
statutes that provided rights to intervene in claims based in law.24 Former 
Equity Rule 37, however, expressly limited the role of intervenors, stating 
that any intervention “shall be in subordination to, and in recognition of, 
the propriety of the main proceeding.”25 This subordinate status was not 
 
19. See Kerry C. White, Note, Rule 24(A) Intervention of Right: Why the Federal Courts 
Should Require Standing to Intervene, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 527, 562 (2002) (noting that public 
interest litigation, bolstered by intervention, leads to a “lawsuit mania”); see also infra text 
accompanying notes 208–214. 
20. See infra Section V.A. 
21. See infra Section V.A. 
22. See infra Section II.B. 
23. See infra Part V. 
24. Federal Equity Rule 37 governed third-party intervention. See 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT 
& ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1903 (3d ed. 2019). Former Equity Rule 
37 read, in pertinent part: “Anyone claiming an interest in the litigation may at any time be permitted 
to assert his right by intervention, but the intervention shall be in subordination to, and in recognition 
of, the propriety of the main proceeding.” Id. at n.2. Rule 24 also replaced state statutes governing 
third-party intervention. See James Wm. Moore & Edward H. Levi, Federal Intervention I. The Right 
to Intervene and Reorganization, 45 YALE L.J. 565, 578 (1936). 
25. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 24, § 1903 n.2; see also Moore & Levi, supra note 24, at 
579 (“[A]n intervenor [as interpreted in the 1930s] . . . has restricted rights.”). 











carried into Rule 24, even in its earliest form in 1938.26 With the drafting 
of Rule 24, “the intervenor is treated as if [she] were an original party and 
has equal standing . . . . [T]he intervenor is entitled to litigate fully on the 
merits once intervention has been granted.”27 This “original litigant” status 
is the key distinction between a Rule 24 intervenor and an amicus.28 
A. Intended Use 
The original purpose of Rule 24 was to consolidate Federal Equity Rule 
37 and competing state statutes supplying a legal right to intervene.29 At 
the time Rule 24 was passed, the Advisory Committee textually 
distinguished Rule 24’s divergent equitable and legal origins.30  
As originally written, the equity portion of Rule 24, section 24(a)(3), 
solely addressed real property rights. 31  This section of the rule was 
considered an absolute right32 because of the likelihood of a third person’s 
rights being “seriously jeopardized” should the court award a piece of real 
property to a litigant without allowing the third party to speak of her rights 
to the same property.33 This is because awarding title to property to one 
party necessarily binds others who claim title to the same property.34 
These policy concerns were driven by the doctrine of res judicata, and 
courts recognized value in “prevent[ing] their processes from being used 
to the prejudice of the rights of interested third persons.”35 
The other portion of Rule 24 dealing with one’s legal rights or claims, 
section 24(a)(2), focused originally on adequacy of representation by the 
current parties to the litigation. This was a discretionary right. 36  To 
 
26. See Spangler v. United States, 415 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1969); see also Cascade Nat. 
Gas Corp. v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 133 (1967) (explaining that Rule 24 was “not merely 
a restatement of existing federal practice at law and in equity”). 
27. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 24, § 1920 (emphasis added); accord Ross v. Bernhard, 396 
U.S. 531, 541 n.15 (1970) (“[T]he intervenor has a right to a jury trial on any legal issues he 
presents.”).  
28. See infra Section II.A. 
29. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 24, § 1920. 
30. “As originally adopted a distinction was made . . . between subdivision (a)(2), allowing 
intervention of right by a person whose interest in the action was not adequately represented by 
existing parties, and subdivision (a)(3), allowing intervention of right by one who might be adversely 
affected by the distribution of property . . . .” WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 24, § 1903; accord Rule 
24(a) as written today, infra note 69. 
31. FED. R. CIV. P. 24 advisory committee’s note to 1966 Amendment. 
32. Moore & Levi, supra note 24, at 581. 
33. Id. at 582. The law’s concern with real property at the beginning of the twentieth century 
was echoed in other areas of the law that dealt with in rem and in personam actions separately. See id.; 
Morris E. Cohn, Note, Jurisdiction in Actions in Rem and in Personam, 14 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 170, 172 
(1929) (discussing the distinction as it pertains to personal jurisdiction). 
34. Moore & Levi, supra note 24, at 582.   
35. Id. at 573. 












intervene under the original section 24(a)(2), a party needed to show both: 
(1) inadequate representation; and (2) that if denied intervention, she 
would otherwise be bound by any judgment in the action.37 The textual 
requirement to demonstrate that one would be bound by the judgment if 
denied intervention echoed that of the real property and equity-driven 
section 24(a)(3) and reflected the same policy concerns about res 
judicata.38  Although section 24(a)(2) does not deal with equity or real 
property,39 the same idea carried through.40  
Additionally, although the legal right targeted by section 24(a)(2) is not 
per se a real property right, the legal right nonetheless originates from real 
property rights. As originally intended, the Advisory Committee sought to 
cover intervenors with a property-like relationship to the litigation,41 such 
as “unsecured creditors, stockholders, or bondholders, and . . . 
taxpayers.”42 Inadequate representation was determined based on collusion 
between the alleged representative of the third party seeking intervention 
(the “Proposed Intervenor”) and the opposing party, representation of an 
interest adverse to the Proposed Intervenor, or, alternatively, breach of a 
duty.43  
B. 1966 Advisory Committee Amendment 
The 1966 Advisory Committee amendment (1966 Amendment) 
eliminated the textual distinction between legal and equitable claims.44 
First, the Advisory Committee removed section 24(a)(3), which dealt only 
with real property.45 Section 24(a)(2), which was originally intended to 
cover legal rights between parties such as creditors and stockholders, was 
merged with 24(a)(3) into one section, which is today section 24(a)(2).46 
Rule 24 currently states that a Proposed Intervenor must simply claim “an 
interest”47 in the property or transaction at issue in the litigation.  
Second, the Advisory Committee removed one of the two requirements 
to intervene from the prior sections 24(a)(2) and (a)(3).48 Under the 1966 
 
37. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 24, § 1907. 
38. See Sam Fox Publ’g Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 688 (1961). 
39. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2). 
40. See Sam Fox Publ’g Co., 366 U.S. at 688. 
41. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24 advisory committee’s note to 1966 Amendment (providing a 
trustee/beneficiary relationship as an example for purposes of interpreting Rule 24(a)(2)). 
42. Moore & Levi, supra note 24, at 581, 592. 
43. Id. at 591–92; see also supra note 41.  
44. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24 advisory committee’s note to 1966 Amendment. 
45. Id. 
46. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 24, § 1903; see infra note 69 for FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a) as 
written today. 
47. See infra note 69 for FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a) as written today.  
48. FED. R. CIV. P. 24 advisory committee’s note to 1966 Amendment. 











Amendment, Proposed Intervenors must only show that representation in 
the litigation is inadequate, not that they will be bound by any judgment in 
the action. 49  Third, and most importantly for this Note, the Advisory 
Committee altered the scope of section 24(a)(2), explicitly stating that: 
The representation whose adequacy comes into question under the 
amended rule is not confined to formal representation like that 
provided by a trustee for his beneficiary . . . . A party to an action 
may provide practical representation to the absentee seeking 
intervention although no such formal relationship exists between 
them, and the adequacy of this practical representation will then 
have to be weighed.50 
This elimination of a textual equitable and legal distinction, and merger 
of both roots into section 24(a)(2), fundamentally altered analyses of Rule 
24 and Rule 24 case law. Indeed, the drafter of the 1966 Amendment, 
Professor Benjamin Kaplan, noted that the purpose of the amendment was 
to “drive beyond the narrow notion of an interest in specific property.”51 
Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co. (Cascade),52 
decided one year after the 1966 Amendment, marked a shift in Rule 24 
interpretation.53 In Cascade, the Proposed Intervenors were gas companies 
that claimed an injury due to an illegal merger and monopoly by their 
competitors. 54  The Court first noted that, at equity, “those ‘adversely 
affected’ by a disposition of property would usually be those who have [a 
real] interest in the property.”55  The Proposed Intervenors had no real 
property interest in the companies that merged; instead, they had an 
interest in not seeing their businesses suffer as a result of the merger.56 The 
Court allowed intervention, thereby implicitly accepting the Advisory 
Committee’s Note to the 1966 Amendment.57 In so doing, the Court stated 
that intervention could no longer be confined “exclusively” to those with a 
 
49. This decision came after the Supreme Court, in Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 
exposed a logical fallacy with Rule 24—if representation is inadequate, a party would not be bound by 
a judgment in a later assertion of res judicata, thus making it “literally” impossible to intervene under 
the former rule. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24 advisory committee’s note to 1966 Amendment; WRIGHT & 
MILLER, supra note 24, § 1903; Sam Fox Publ’g Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 694 (1961). 
50. FED. R. CIV. P. 24 advisory committee’s note to 1966 Amendment (emphasis added). 
51. Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 405 (1967). Professor Kaplan noted that 
this was his main intention, in addition to dealing with the Sam Fox fallacy. Id.; see supra note 49. 
52. 386 U.S. 129 (1967). 
53. Id.; see also Flynn v. Hubbard, 782 F.2d 1084, 1087 (1st Cir. 1986) (“The [Cascade] Court 
explored the differences between the present rule and its predecessor.”). 
54. Cascade, 386 U.S. at 132–33. 
55. Id. at 133. 
56. Id. at 135. 












property interest.58 In other words, the Court determined that intervention 
must no longer be read in the narrow terms of a real property or property-
like right.59  
After the 1966 Amendment and Cascade, a party could allege an 
intangible harm rather than a right grounded in real property. Indeed, the 
Cascade Court was the first to shape the two requirements of the current 
Rule 24(a)(2) that together make up the burden to intervene as of right: a 
protectable interest60 and adequacy of representation.61 The Cascade Court 
held that intervention should be granted because Rule 24(a)(2) “recognizes 
as a proper element in intervention ‘an interest’ in the ‘transaction which is 
the subject of the action,’” and because the existing parties “have fallen far 
short of representing . . . [Proposed Intervenors’] interests.”62 
The Cascade majority’s embrace of the new Rule 24 was not accepted 
by all of the judiciary. In his dissent to Cascade, Justice Stewart expressed 
concern about allowing intervention when a Proposed Intervenor alleges 
simply a “general” harm as her interest in the litigation.63 Following the 
Court’s decision in Cascade, several courts also feared that intervention 
would begin to be permitted “by anyone at any time.”64 
Despite these concerns, the only time the Court has read a Proposed 
Intervenor as stretching the burden of Rule 24(a)(2) “too far” was in 
Donaldson v. United States.65 In Donaldson, the Court applied a loose 
Rule 24(a)(2) burden to a fact-specific tax context, in a judgment which 
was later superseded by a tax statute.66 Any initial concern about the scope 
 
58. Id. at 133. 
59. See id. at 133–34 (noting that the original purpose of Rule 24 was to allow intervention 
only where “right[s] . . . would be lost absent intervention,” as with disputes over title to property). 
60. The Cascade Court described a sufficient-interest requirement, Cascade, 386 U.S. at 132–
36, which was later clarified by the Court in Donaldson v. United States to be a “significantly 
protectable interest.” Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531 (1971); see also Gunter, supra 
note 17, at 657–59.  
61. See Rule 24(a)(2) as drafted today, infra note 69. Although the text of Rule 24 is facially a 
four-factor test, these two factors have caused the most unrest between circuits and are considered the 
most complex. See Gunter, supra note 17, at 657, 660; Donaldson, 400 U.S. at 531. Therefore, 
together they make up the burden on Proposed Intervenors. See id.  
62. Cascade, 386 U.S. at 129, 135–36. 
63. Id. at 147 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“These general and indefinite interests do not even 
remotely resemble the direct and concrete stake in litigation required for intervention of right.”). 
64. Hobson v. Hansen, 44 F.R.D. 18, 25 (D.D.C 1968) (“But Cascade should not be read as a 
carte blanche for intervention by anyone at any time.”); see also Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68 
n.21 (1986) (citing United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1980)) (arguing 
that intervention is proper only if the would-be intervenor has an interest in the outcome of the suit 
different from that of the public as a whole); cf. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line 
Co., 690 F.2d 1203, 1210 n.5 (5th Cir. 1982) (“Yet in [Cascade], the Supreme Court recognized that 
the current, 1966 version of Rule 24 expands the opportunities for intervention.”).   
65. 400 U.S. 517, 528 (1971). 
66. Compare Donaldson, 400 U.S. at 528, with Tiffany Fine Arts, Inc. v. United States, 469 
U.S. 310, 316 (1985).  











of the Rule 24(a)(2) interest and adequacy of representation requirements 
seems to have disappeared in recent years.67 
C. Court Application and Typical Use 
Since its implementation and the Cascade Court’s demarcation of the 
interest and adequacy of representation burden, courts have translated Rule 
24 into a four-factor test.68 To intervene as of right under Rule 24(a),69 a 
party’s motion to intervene must: (1) be timely; (2) claim a significantly 
protectable interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject 
of the action; (3) be so situated that the disposition of the action may, as a 
practicable matter, impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect that 
interest; and (4) demonstrate that the existing parties to the litigation fail to 
adequately represent the applicant’s interest. 70  All four elements are 
required to intervene.71 Therefore, succeeding on a motion to intervene as 
of right should theoretically be a high burden to pass. In reality, it is not.72  
This Note will focus on courts’ analysis of elements (2) and (4): a 
significantly protectable interest and adequacy of representation. These 
two elements together have, in practice, formed the burden a Proposed 
Intervenor must meet under Rule 24(a)(2) to intervene as of right. 73 
Beyond the fact that these are the elements the Cascade Court focused 
on,74 later courts have noted that these are the most complex and malleable 
factors, as well as theoretically the most difficult to prove.75 
II. WHY INTERVENE? 
Intervention is an attractive option to litigants due to its advantages 
over two similar procedural devices: amicus curiae briefs and joinder. 
 
67. See discussion infra Section III.B. 
68. 2 MOORE’S MANUAL: FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 14.100 (2019). 
69. Rule 24(a) reads:  
(a) INTERVENTION OF RIGHT. On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene 
who: (1) is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute; or (2) claims an 
interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so 
situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s 
ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a). This Note focuses on Rule 24(a)(2). 
70. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 24, § 1903. 
71. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2). 
72. See infra Parts III–V. 
73. See supra text accompanying notes 61–62. 
74. Cascade Nat. Gas Corp. v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 132 (1967). 
75. See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531 (1971) (coining the term “significantly 
protectable interest”); Gunter, supra note 17, at 657, 660–61 (describing the deep-seated circuit split as 
to which interests qualify as “significantly protectable” and noting that the adequacy of representation 












First, and most importantly, Rule 24 intervention provides an opportunity 
for Proposed Intervenors to make politico-ideological statements in court 
with an original litigant status.76 Such statements have been traditionally 
reserved for amicus briefs, in which the writing amicus is not considered 
an original litigant.77 Second, the structure of how to enter a lawsuit under 
Rule 24 and the loose supplemental jurisdiction requirements that apply as 
to who may intervene give Rule 24 intervention a “distinct advantage” 
over other procedural devices, such as joinder.78 
A. Differences from Amicus Briefs 
Unlike intervention, in which a Proposed Intervenor must demonstrate 
a lack of “adequate representation” as well as a “significantly protectable 
interest” in the subject matter of the suit, amici bring up relevant matters 
not before the court. 79  For this reason, amicus briefs have long been 
considered a valuable forum to deliver political protests or “ideological 
preferences” before the court.80 This is not to say that amici seek different 
relief than original litigants. 81  In fact, amici must align with a party 
“whose position the amicus supports.”82 The Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure additionally have procedures in place to ensure that amicus 
arguments are truly outside perspectives supporting an original party’s 
desired relief, rather than “duplicative arguments” to those of an original 
party.83 This requirement is echoed in the Supreme Court’s rules.84 
Further, there are no res judicata concerns with amici as there are with 
intervenors.85 Amici are not parties to the proceeding and have no court-
recognized legally protectable rights in the underlying litigation, nor must 
 
76. See supra text accompanying note 27. 
77. See sources cited supra note 10. 
78. Richard D. Freer, Rethinking Compulsory Joinder: A Proposal to Restructure Federal Rule 
19, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1061, 1086 (1985) [hereinafter Freer, Rethinking]. 
79. Compare FED. R. APP. P. 29, with FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2). 
80. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the 
Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 748, 831–34 (2000).   
81. FED. R. APP. P. 29 advisory committee’s note to 2010 amendment. 
82. Id. It bears noting that this standard for amici, who do not require standing, is echoed by the 
standard set in place for intervenors to demonstrate standing in Town of Chester. 137 S. Ct. 1645 
(2017); see infra Section V.A. 
83. FED. R. APP. P. 29 advisory committee’s note to 2010 amendment. 
84. See SUP. CT. R. 37 (“An amicus curiae brief that brings to the attention of the Court 
relevant matter not already brought to its attention by the parties may be of considerable help to the 
Court. An amicus curiae brief that does not serve this purpose burdens the Court, and its filing is not 
favored.”). 
85. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.34(d), (e)(5) (2012); see also Michael K. Lowman, Comment, The 
Litigating Amicus Curiae: When Does the Party Begin After the Friends Leave?, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 
1243, 1274–76 (1992). 











they demonstrate Article III standing.86  Therefore, any claim they may 
have would not be precluded by res judicata in later actions. On the other 
hand, by granting intervention, courts recognize that an intervenor has a 
legally protectable right and award intervenors with original litigant 
status.87 Once an intervenor is awarded such status, they are precluded 
from re-litigating their claims under principles of res judicata.88 
Despite their differences, both intervenors and amici have the potential 
to play pivotal roles in a given litigation. In City of Lockhart v. United 
States, the intervenors were not just sideline litigants, but rather presented 
the only argument before the Supreme Court.89 In all cases, intervenors are 
able to present oral argument before courts without leave, as they are 
considered original litigants. 90  Alternatively, amici are “friends of the 
court”91 who argue without a direct stake in the case, and may only present 
oral argument if a court asks them to or grants them leave.92 An automatic 
right to appeal further attaches to denial of a motion to intervene as of 
right, while amici have no such involvement in the outcome of the case.93 
However, the outside perspectives raised by amicus briefs can be weighed 
equally with arguments raised by original litigants, thus allowing amici to 
play as critical of a role in litigation as intervenors can.94 Indeed, at the 
Supreme Court level, “the Court decided [Mapp v. Ohio] based on an 
argument put forth by an amicus curiae but not addressed by either 
party.”95 Amicus briefs remain important today, as amicus “briefs were 
 
86. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.34(e)(5) (2012). 
87. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.34(d) (2012). 
88. See Res Judicata, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
89. 460 U.S. 125, 129–30 (1983). 
90. See, e.g., Oral Argument, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FOURTH CIR. (July 2019), 
https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/appellateprocedureguide/Calendaring___Argument/APG-oralargument. 
html [https://perma.cc/WFE6-GUQT].  
91. See Amicus Curiae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
92. See Stephen G. Masciocchi, What Amici Curiae Can and Cannot Do with Amicus Briefs, 
COLO. LAW., Apr. 2017, at 23, 24. 
93. See, e.g., Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62–64 (1986). Given these differences, states’ 
choice to file under Rule 24(a)(2)—rather than introduce their argument under relevancy grounds as 
amici—demonstrates that the state recognizes the issue or interest as important and protectable for its 
citizens. See, e.g., Order, Darweesh v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-00480-CBA (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2017), 
ECF No. 71 (granting motion to intervene filed by the New York State Attorney General to dispute 
executive order Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States (Executive 
Order)); Order, Aziz v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-00116-LMB-TCB (E.D. Va. Feb. 3, 2017), ECF No. 37 
(granting motion to intervene by the Commonwealth of Virginia and two affected individuals to 
dispute the Executive Order). 
94. Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 
101 YALE L.J. 31, 77 n.173 (1991) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)); see also Brief of 
Amici Curiae River City Gender Alliance and ACLU of Texas in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Preliminary injunction, Franciscan All. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (No. 7:16-
cv-00108-O) (amicus brief filed by Proposed Intervenors while they were waiting for a decision on 
their motion to intervene). 












cited or referred to in 18 percent of the opinions rendered by the Court or 
by individual Justices over the last decade.”96 During the 2017–18 term 
alone, amicus brief filings set a new record: amicus briefs were filed in all 
sixty-three cases heard by the Court, with an average of fourteen briefs 
filed per case.97 This has led to a total of roughly eight hundred amicus 
briefs filed per term.98 This record is reflective of a trend, as these numbers 
indicate an 800 percent increase in amicus brief filings since the 1950s and 
a 95 percent increase in amicus brief filings since 1995.99 In addition to 
their influence on Court decisions and their increasing filing frequency, 
amicus briefs are also important at the threshold level and are “influential 
in determining which cases the Court will hear.”100 
To be sure, some commentators and judges take issue with politico-
ideological advocacy in amicus briefs, 101  even though amici are not 
considered original litigants like intervenors are.102 Critics of amicus briefs 
have rebuked them for “treat[ing] the Court as if it were Congress 
considering a piece of legislation, not a judicial body deliberating points of 
law.”103 In Jaffee v. Redmond,104 Justice Scalia challenged amicus briefs as 
a “form of interest group lobbying” by self-interested organizations.105 
Despite these arguments, the majority of practitioners view such politico-
ideological arguments as appropriate in the amicus context in order to 
“provide valuable assistance” and background information to courts, 
which the original parties have not already supplied.106  
Critics’ fears about amicus briefs will not materialize as long as courts 
forbid litigants from “mold[ing] the litigating amicus curiae into a vessel 
enabling third parties, lacking the requisite standing, to enter into federal 
courts and directly participate in a given litigation.”107 This, critics argue, 
would provide the “mystical gateway” to original litigant status that public 
 
96.  Amicus Briefs in the Supreme Court, MAYER BROWN, https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/pe 
rspectives-events/publications/no-date/amicus-briefs-in-the-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/24SQ-29 
DF]. 
97. Professors’ Amicus Curiae Briefs Shape the Law, COLUM. L. SCH. (Jan. 18, 2019), https:// 
www.law.columbia.edu/news/2019/01/supreme-court-amicus-curiae-briefs [https://perma.cc/EL2Z-X 
MAC]. 
98. Allison Orr Larsen & Neal Devins, The Amicus Machine, 102 VA. L. REV. 1901, 1902 
(2016).   
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 1901. 
101. See e.g., Kearney & Merrill, supra note 80. 
102. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 24, with FED. R. APP. P. 29. 
103. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 80, at 756 n.36 (quoting Lee Epstein, Courts and Interest 
Groups, in THE AMERICAN COURTS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 335, 349 (John B. Gates & Charles A. 
Johnson eds., 1991)).  
104. 518 U.S. 1 (1996). 
105. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 80, at 746.  
106. Id. at 745.  
107. Lowman, supra note 85, at 1281. 











interest attorneys seek.108 Of course, in practice, the amicus brief has not 
been molded in such a way; instead, Rule 24 intervention has.109 This Note 
maintains that amicus briefs remain the appropriate, and most effective, 
forum for outside politico-ideological perspectives. 
B.  Differences from Rule 19 and Rule 20 Joinder: Safeguarding Truth, 
Justice, and Efficiency 
Although third-party intervention has its origins in real property, its 
advantages mirror those of FRCP 19 (Rule 19)110  and FRCP 20 (Rule 
20) 111  general litigation joinder. Rules 19 and 20 support inclusive 
packaging because including every party with an interest in the litigation 
in one suit “eliminates duplicative litigation” and is therefore more 
efficient and expends fewer judicial resources.112  In the case of social 
justice litigation, this advantage is especially prevalent because the 
efficiency interest is “forward-looking” and “turn[s] on similar legal 
questions [rather] than various divergent factual disputes.”113 Moreover, 
inclusive packaging in litigation can help ensure that all absentees “gain 
notice of the pending suit and of [their] right to intervene.”114 In that sense, 
under the logic of joinder, having a low Rule 24(a)(2) burden would 
support res judicata because theoretically all parties should receive notice 
of a pending lawsuit. 
However, having a low Rule 24(a)(2) burden actually defeats the 
purpose of res judicata. The logic of joinder does not apply in the Rule 24 
context. This is because with joinder, either the original parties or the 
court invite another party into the litigation. With intervention, the 
intervening third party invites itself into the litigation.115 Given that Rule 
24 Proposed Intervenors selectively choose the lawsuits into which they 
will intervene, and may now do so through a very generalized “interest” in 
the lawsuit, the amount of people who may intervene is limitless. 116 
Further, jurisdictionally, there is no barrier as to who may intervene—
other than the complete diversity requirement for lawsuits brought under 
diversity jurisdiction—because courts only need supplemental jurisdiction 
 
108. Id. 
109. See discussion infra Section V.A. 
110. FED. R. CIV. P. 19. 
111. FED. R. CIV. P. 20. 
112. Richard D. Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: Rethinking Plaintiff Autonomy and the 
Court’s Role in Defining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 809, 813 (1989) [hereinafter Freer, 
Avoiding]. 
113. Gunter, supra note 17, at 663. 
114. Freer, Avoiding, supra note 112, at 841. 
115. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 19, and FED. R. CIV. P. 20, with FED. R. CIV. P. 24. 












over cases in order for Proposed Intervenors to join them.117 Given the 
structure of how to intervene and the lack of jurisdictional limits, 
intervention faces an overinclusiveness issue and getting notice of a 
lawsuit to those in another state is practically more difficult than with 
joinder.118 Although inclusive packaging is an advantage to those seeking 
to intervene on a massive, politico-ideological scale, the low Rule 24 
burden defeats the goals of res judicata.119 While truth may be protected 
because all voices are brought together, justice is shortchanged due to 
notice issues. Further, any efficiency advantages with Rules 19 and 20 are 
altogether lost due to the structure of who may intervene under Rule 24 
and the lack of jurisdictional limits. 
III. MOTIONS TO INTERVENE IN THE SOCIAL JUSTICE CONTEXT: COURTS 
EASE THE RULE 24(A)(2) BURDEN AND CLOSE THE GAP BETWEEN 
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 
For decades after Cascade, courts struggled to articulate what exactly 
constituted a significantly protectable interest and adequacy of 
representation for the Rule 24(a)(2) burden. 120  As a result of these 
difficulties and differences of opinion, courts’ interpretations of what 
connotes a significantly protectable interest and adequacy of 
representation under Rule 24(a)(2) grew even broader.121 This loosened 
burden made intervention under Rule 24(a)(2) very attractive to Proposed 
Intervenors.  
 
117. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012); Freer, Rethinking, supra note 78, at 1087; see also Jeffrey L. 
Rensberger, Note, Ancillary Jurisdiction and Intervention Under Federal Rule 24: Analysis and 
Proposals, 58 IND. L.J. 111, 112 (1982). The looser supplemental jurisdiction requirement can be 
traced to Rule 24’s original requirement that to intervene, a party must demonstrate that it would be 
bound by the judgment. Id. at 118; cf. Jurisdiction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) 
(defining ancillary jurisdiction as a court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate claims properly before the court 
and over which “the court would not otherwise have jurisdiction” and noting that “[t]he concept of 
ancillary jurisdiction has now been codified . . . in the supplemental-jurisdiction statute”). 
118. See discussion infra Section V.B. 
119. This is because social justice intervenors use the procedural advantage to band together in 
large numbers to intervene. See, e.g., text accompanying and sources cited infra notes 150, 168, 176, 
192, 196, 200, 245. 
120. See sources cited supra notes 63–64. 
121. See, e.g., Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 2011); see 
also id. at 1176 (construing a significantly protectable interest as an “interest [that] is protectable under 
some law”). 











A. When the Rule 24(a)(2) Burden Began to Broaden 
The first successful social justice intervention motion at the Supreme 
Court occurred in 1998 in Grutter v. Bollinger.122 Grutter was a reverse 
affirmative action lawsuit brought by a white law student against the 
University of Michigan Law School alleging that its affirmative action 
policy was discriminatory. 123  A group of forty-one minority students 
moved to intervene to protect their interest in accessing higher 
education.124 The District Court denied the motion on the grounds that the 
interest was not sufficient for intervention, 125  but the Sixth Circuit 
overturned the decision.126 The Sixth Circuit emphasized that the burden to 
show a significantly protectable interest and inadequate representation was 
low and accepted a “rather expansive notion of the interest sufficient to 
invoke intervention of right.” 127  The Sixth Circuit also held that 
intervenors must only show that the representation “might be” 
inadequate.128 The Supreme Court affirmed.129 
Lower courts both contributed to and followed the Supreme Court’s 
precedent. For example, the Ninth Circuit defined significantly protectable 
interest as merely “a measure [the Proposed Intervenor] has supported.”130 
Similarly, the Tenth, Second, and Eighth Circuits each referred to the 
burden as “minimal.”131  The Eleventh Circuit adopted a broad interest 
standard of seeking to “vindicat[e] important personal interests”132 and that 
Proposed Intervenors need only “some” evidence to show inadequacy of 
representation.133 
 
122. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); see also Joanne Villanueva, The Power of 
Procedure: The Critical Role of Minority Intervention in the Wake of Ricci v. DeStefano, 99 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1083, 1088 (2011). One prior public interest intervention motion had been filed in the reverse 
affirmative action context, but was filed too late and denied as moot. Id. at 1089–90 (citing Bakke v. 
Regents of Univ. of Cal., 553 P.2d 1152 (Cal. 1976)). Bakke was a state action, filed under 
California’s state intervention rule, which though entirely discretionary, is analogous to Rule 24(a)(2). 
Id. at 1089 n.36. 
123. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 316–17; see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 183 F.R.D. 209 (E.D. Mich. 
1998), rev’d sub nom. Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 1999). 
124. Grutter, 188 F.3d at 397. 
125. Gratz, 183 F.R.D. at 213. 
126. Grutter, 188 F.3d at 400–01. 
127. Id. at 398 (quoting Mich. State AFL–CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1245 (6th Cir. 1997)). 
128. Id. at 400. 
129. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343–44 (2003). 
130. Idaho Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1995). 
131. San Juan Cty. v. United States, 420 F.3d 1197, 1210 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Utah Ass’n 
of Ctys., 255 F.3d 1246, 1253 (10th Cir. 2001)); U.S. Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 579 F.2d 188, 193 (2d 
Cir. 1978); Planned Parenthood of Minn., Inc. v. Citizens for Cmty. Action, 558 F.2d 861, 869 (8th 
Cir. 1977) (quoting Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972)). 
132. Dillard v. Baldwin Cty. Comm’rs, 225 F.3d 1271, 1278 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Meek v. 
Metro. Dade Cty., 985 F.2d 1471, 1480 (11th Cir. 1993)). 












B.  To Infinity and Beyond: The Rule 24(a)(2) Burden Becomes Nearly 
Unlimited in Scope 
As discussed in Donaldson, the one time a Court majority has spoken 
about an interpretation of the Rule 24(a)(2) significantly protectable 
interest portion of the burden going “too far” was in a fact-specific 
taxpayer context.134 The decision was later overturned by a tax statute.135 
As to the adequacy of representation portion of the burden, the Court has 
adopted a favorable attitude towards intervention. In line with later circuit 
court decisions,136 the Court held in Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of 
America 137  that Proposed Intervenors satisfy the “minimal” adequate 
representation prong of the burden by showing “[their] representation . . . 
‘may be’ inadequate.”138 
Indeed, in Wilderness Society v. United States Forest Service, 139  in 
which Proposed Intervenors were an environmental group alleging 
environmental impact statement violations against the Forest Service 
under the National Environmental Policy Act, the Ninth Circuit expanded 
even further the increasingly broad interpretation of Rule 24’s already 
minimal requirements. The court broadly defined “interest” simply as an 
interest under “some law” and “representation” as parties with “a 
relationship.”140  
Similarly, as the burden grew gradually lower, courts began to use 
words traditionally associated with an amicus brief to define the Rule 24 
burden. In Dumont v. Lyon,141 both individual intervenors and a religious 
charity group intervened to protect the Michigan Children’s Services 
Agency’s use of religious criteria in placing foster children.142 Once the 
court granted the charity’s motion to intervene,143 the plaintiffs opposed 
the individual intervenors’ motions because their interest was purely 
hypothetical—the “potential . . . [to] lose the opportunity to ‘work with 
trusted social workers—’”144  and because their interest was adequately 
 
134. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 528 (1971). 
135. 26 U.S.C. § 7609 (2012); compare Donaldson, 400 U.S. at 528, with Tiffany Fine Arts, Inc. 
v. United States, 469 U.S. 310, 316 (1985). 
136. See sources cited supra notes 130–133. 
137. 404 U.S. 528 (1972). 
138. Id. at 538 n.10. 
139. 630 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2011). 
140. Id. at 1176 (quoting Sierra Club v. EPA, 995 F.2d 1478, 1484 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
141. 341 F. Supp. 3d 706 (E.D. Mich. 2018). 
142. Motion to Intervene, Dumont v. Lyon, 341 F. Supp. 3d 706 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (No. 2:17-
cv-13080-PDB-EAS), ECF No. 18. 
143. Order Granting Unopposed Motion of St. Vincent Catholic Charities to Intervene, Dumont 
v. Lyon, 341 F. Supp. 3d 706 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (No. 2:17-cv-13080-PDB-EAS), ECF No. 31. 
144. Order Granting Melissa Buck, Chad Buck, and Shamber Flore’s Motion to Intervene at 15, 
Dumont v. Lyon, 341 F. Supp. 3d 706 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (No. 2:17-cv-13080-PDB-EAS), ECF No. 











represented by the charity that had been granted intervention.145 However, 
the court allowed intervention on a theory that the individual Proposed 
Intervenors brought outside “perspectives” to the analysis that other 
representatives may not have. 146  Problematically, an “outside 
perspectives” interest standard rings of that afforded an amicus brief, 
rather than intervention.147 
When the relief sought is the same as that of the original litigants, and a 
broad Rule 24 burden is allowed, intervention leads to duplicative 
litigation. In Amazon.com LLC v. Lay, 148  a group of North Carolina 
citizens intervened in an action brought by Amazon against the North 
Carolina Department of Revenue.149 The citizens sought to quiet a North 
Carolina order that Amazon disclose customers’ personal information.150 
The court permitted intervention and explained that potential impairment 
of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights satisfied the significantly 
protectable interest under the “some law” requirement.151 As for adequacy 
of representation, the court accepted the argument that the Proposed 
Intervenors would simply “not make the same arguments” that Amazon 
would.152 As a result of the order, the intervenors were permitted to file 
their own intervention complaint,153 to which the defendant had to file a 
separate motion to dismiss.154 The defendant also had to settle separately 
with the intervenors.155 This is despite the fact that Amazon sought the 
same relief as the intervenors: to quash the North Carolina Department of 
Commerce’s order. Indeed, in the settlement order, the court 
acknowledged that it would be an “unnecessary use of judicial resources to 
 
34. More specifically, the three individual intervenors’ hypothetical injuries were in the volunteer 
work and future foster children, respectively, that they would lose if the religious charity were forced 
to cease its foster placement program. Id. at 17–18. 
145. Id. at 19. 
146. See id. at 18–19. 
147. See supra text accompanying note 79. 
148. Amazon.com LLC v. Lay, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (W.D. Wash. 2010). 
149. Order Granting Intervenors’ Motion to Intervene and Motion to File Complaint in 
Intervention Using Pseudonyms at 2, Amazon.com LLC v. Lay, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (W.D. Wash. 
2010) (No. 2:10-cv-00664-MJP), ECF No. 58. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. at 3; see also Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 
2011). 
152. Order Granting Intervenors’ Motion to Intervene and Motion to File Complaint in 
Intervention Using Pseudonyms at 3, Amazon.com LLC v. Lay, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (W.D. Wash. 
2010) (No. 2:10-cv-00664-MJP), ECF No. 58. 
153. Complaint in Intervention for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Amazon.com LLC v. Lay, 
758 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (W.D. Wash. 2010) (No. 2:10-cv-00664-MJP), ECF No. 61. 
154. North Carolina Motion to Dismiss Complaint in Intervention (Fed. R. Civ. P. 12), 
Amazon.com LLC v. Lay, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (W.D. Wash. 2010) (No. 2:10-cv-00664-MJP), ECF 
No. 64. 
155. Stipulated Judgement Re Complaint in Intervention, Amazon.com LLC v. Lay, 758 F. 












further litigate Intervenors’ overlapping claims [with those of 
Amazon].”156 
These trends are problematic because, as explicitly acknowledged by 
courts, litigation costs and judicial energy are unnecessarily expended for 
arguments that can be made by an original party or in an amicus brief.157 
As the Fourth Circuit noted, “[w]hen the party seeking intervention has the 
same ultimate objective as a party to the suit, a presumption arises that its 
interests are adequately represented.”158 This, of course, would make it so 
any party seeking the same relief as an original litigant, which is the 
standard set out in Town of Chester for intervenors to avoid showing 
independent standing, 159  would fail the interest and adequacy 
representation prongs of the burden to intervene. When an outside party 
seeks the same relief as an original litigant, as is often the case in social 
justice actions, 160  an amicus brief is the appropriate forum to supply 
additional perspectives.161 Indeed, this is already the desired standard for 
an amicus: “coordination between the amicus and the party whose position 
the amicus supports.”162 
Courts’ expansion of the Rule 24 burden led to a flood of litigation163 
by social justice parties seeking to intervene.164 With each intervention 
 
156. Id. at 2. 
157. See discussion of the removal of the independent standing requirement when a Proposed 
Intervenor seeks the same relief as an original party, infra Section V.A. 
158. Virginia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 542 F.2d 214, 216 (4th Cir. 1976). 
159. See infra Section V.A. 
160. See supra text accompanying notes 16–17. 
161. See supra text accompanying notes 79–83. 
162. FED. R. APP. P. 29 advisory committee’s note to 2010 amendment; see also supra text 
accompanying note 82. 
163. See, e.g., Brief in Support of Proposed Intervenors Stand with Trans and Williamston High 
School Gay-Straight Alliance’s Motion to Intervene as Defendants Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(B), 
Reynolds v. Talberg, No. 1:18-cv-00069-PLM-PJG (W.D. Mich. Mar. 12, 2018), ECF No. 9 (seeking 
intervention on behalf of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender students to uphold anti-bullying and 
harassment policy in their school district); Motion to Intervene as Defendant and Memorandum in 
Support, Parents for Privacy v. Dall. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 326 F. Supp. 3d 1075 (D. Or. 2018) (No. 3:17-
cv-01813-HZ), ECF No. 24 (seeking intervention on behalf of transgender students and parents to 
uphold the validity of school district’s safety plan for student bathroom use); Motion to Intervene of 
River City Gender Alliance and ACLU of Texas, Franciscan All. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660 
(N.D. Tex. 2016) (No. 7:16-cv-00108-O), ECF No. 7 (seeking intervention on behalf of 150 
transgender individuals receiving care at Catholic hospitals in order to uphold the validity of U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services’ “Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities” 
regulation).  
164. It bears noting, however, that although the loosened significantly protectable interest and 
adequacy of representation requirements, coupled with the removal of the independent standing 
requirement, heavily favor social justice intervenors, they also favor intervenors seeking to quiet 
public interest actions. See, e.g., Motion of Republican Congressional Delegation, Ohio Voters, and 
Republican Party Organizations to Intervene, Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Smith, No. 1:18-cv-
00357-TSB (S.D. Ohio July 20, 2018), ECF No. 42; Memorandum in Support of Motion of 
Republican Congressional Delegation, Ohio Voters, and Republican Party Organizations to Intervene, 
Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Smith, No. 1:18-cv-00357-TSB (S.D. Ohio July 20, 2018), ECF No. 











motion, various public interest Proposed Intervenors publicize their filings 
on social media, generating politico-ideological support. 165  Proposed 
Intervenors use social media to engage community support of the motion 
before the court—much like lobbyists do with legislation before 
Congress.166 This goal could easily be accomplished instead through the 
filing and publicizing of an amicus brief. An amicus brief would still allow 
social justice advocates’ voices to be heard in court and advertised on 
social media, but would not unnecessarily waste judicial resources and 
interfere with other doctrines.167 Indeed, in one case, a social media post 
advertised a 240-person effort to intervene and encouraged other 
supporters to intervene as well, telling others “[i]t’s . . . NOT too late to 
Intervene [sic].” 168  This type of situation is where massive-scale 
intervention begins to tread dangerously close to skirting the rigorous 
requirements of FRCP 23 (Rule 23) class actions.169 
IV. INTERVENTION TO MAKE POLITICAL STATEMENTS 
In recent years, courts have allowed a nearly limitless definition of 
“significantly protectable interest” and “adequacy of representation” in 
determining whether a party may intervene. 170  As such, Proposed 
Intervenors and groups of intervenors have recently begun to use the 
procedural tool to rally political support over social media and on public 
interest group websites.171 This trend most recently spread to immigration 
 
43; Order Granting Motion for Intervention (DKT. 42), Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Smith, No. 
1:18-cv-00357-TSB (S.D. Ohio Aug. 16, 2018), ECF No. 64 (allowing intervention by Ohio 
Republican voters in lawsuit by Democratic Party organizations regarding partisan gerrymandering 
issue); Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-cv-1517-TC, 2016 WL 183903, at *4 (D. Or. Jan. 14, 2016) 
(permitting industrial organizations to intervene in lawsuit brought by environmental activists 
regarding fossil fuel emissions dispute simply because their interest was “broader” than that of 
government parties). 
165. See, e.g., Equality Case Files, FACEBOOK (June 30, 2017), https://www.facebook.com/Equa 
lityCaseFiles/posts/franciscan-alliance-v-cochran-acluriver-city-gender-alliances-5th-circuit-appeal/13 
52627471439111/ [https://perma.cc/H4LW-XVVA] (publicizing motion to intervene filed in 
Franciscan Alliance, discussed supra note 163, which garnered over 13 likes, comments, and shares); 
Protest SeaWorld, FACEBOOK (Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.facebook.com/protestseaworldsandiego/p 
osts/aldf-and-sscs-file-motion/479366265581709/ [https://perma.cc/ML3X-DE3T] (publicizing motion 
to intervene by the Animal Legal Defense Fund, gaining 14 likes and a share).  
166. See infra text accompanying note 259. 
167. See discussion of interference with standing, class actions, res judicata, and jurisdiction, 
infra Part V. 
168. Preserve Roanoke, FACEBOOK (Nov. 28, 2015), https://www.facebook.com/PreserveRoano 
ke/posts/it%E2%80%99s-really-not-too-late/1061434510543520/ [https://perma.cc/6M38-9RLN] 
(advertising to members, “[f]irst, a big thank you to the 240 people who filed a Motion to Intervene,” 
and second, letting others know “[i]t’s . . . NOT too late to Intervene [sic]”). 
169. See discussion infra Section V.B. 
170. See discussion supra Section III.B. 












intervention motions.172 In addition to the increased filing of intervention 
motions by social justice intervenors, those seeking to quiet public interest 
actions, as well as the government, have also taken advantage of the lower 
burden to intervene.173 This has led to endless, contentious intervention 
motions crowding the stage of the original litigation, which has created 
what is essentially interest group lobbying and political debate under the 
auspices of the federal courts.174 
A. Immigration Intervention Motions During the Obama and Trump 
Administrations 
Individuals, in groups sometimes encompassing hundreds of people,175 
have intervened in a wide range of immigration-related cases. None have 
been dismissed for a lack of interest or adequacy of representation.176 
These intervenors thus make highly political statements, previously 
reserved for amici, as original litigants before the court. The burden is now 
too low, and massive scale politico-ideological intervention is not only 
impractical but also clashes with doctrines of standing, class actions, res 
judicata, and jurisdiction.177 
As early as 2012, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education 
Fund (MALDEF) began filing motions to intervene under Rule 24 on 
behalf of various individual documented and undocumented immigrants 
 
172. See sources cited infra note 206. 
173. See infra Part IV.B. 
174. See, e.g., text accompanying and sources cited supra note 103 (discussing critics’ fear of 
procedural devices being used to allow interest groups to lobby before the courts); see also infra note 
257 (discussing the rigorous requirements behind the standing doctrine, which was designed partly to 
ensure that parties allege a concrete, rather than hypothetical, injury). 
175. See, e.g., text accompanying and sources cited infra notes 192, 196. 
176. All motions have either been granted as originally filed, rendered moot due to dismissal of 
the underlying suit, or granted on appeal. See, e.g., Opposed Motion for Leave to Intervene, Alabama 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, No. 2:18-cv-00772-RDP (N.D. Ala. July 12, 2018), ECF No. 6 (seeking 
intervention on behalf of a group of named individuals to challenge the State of Alabama’s suit, which 
seeks an order declaring undocumented immigrants as non-persons under the Constitution); Petition to 
Intervene on Behalf of Individuals Currently and Formerly Detained at Berks County Residential 
Center, In re Berks Cty. Residential Ctr., BHA No. 061-16-0003 (Apr. 9, 2018) (groups of named 
parents and children requesting intervention on behalf of thirty-five detainees seeking an order to cease 
operation of the detention center pursuant to Pennsylvania Department of Human Services 
regulations); Intervenor-Defendants’ Motion to Intervene, Tennessee v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 1:17-
cv-01040-STA-egb (W.D. Tenn. June 2, 2017), ECF No. 25 (Tennessee Immigrant and Refugee 
Rights Coalition, Bridge Refugee Services, Inc., and Nashville International Center for Empowerment 
seeking intervention on behalf of their thousands of members to support efforts to block refugee 
resettlement in Tennessee). Berks County Residential Center was brought under the Pennsylvania State 
version of Rule 24, which has a nearly identical interest and adequacy of representation burden. See 1 
PA. CODE § 35.28 (2019). 
177. See infra Part V. 











living in the United States. 178  While MALDEF supplies Proposed 
Intervenors with staff attorneys and representation for their day in court, it 
is the individuals themselves who are named in the intervention 
complaints and whose rights are on the line.179  
One such MALDEF intervention took place in Texas v. United States 
(Texas I).180  In Texas I, the State of Texas filed a lawsuit against the 
United States to challenge President Obama’s implementation of the 
Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent 
Residents (DAPA) program.181 MALDEF sought intervention on behalf of 
three undocumented immigrant mothers.182 In its press release, MALDEF 
acknowledged that Texas’s lawsuit was motivated by politics, and that 
intervention was the strongest move they could make, likely due to its 
procedural advantages over amicus briefs.183 The release stated: “While 
this is plainly nothing but a political case filed by forces seeking to 
demonize immigrants and obstruct national progress, it ought not go 
forward without [intervention] from some of those most affected by our 
current antiquated immigration system . . . .”184  
The Honorable Andrew S. Hanen of the Southern District of Texas 
denied the intervention motion in Texas I, but was reversed on appeal by 
the Fifth Circuit. 185  The Fifth Circuit examined the significantly 
protectable interest and adequacy of representation burden requirements of 
Rule 24(a)(2) in granting intervention. 186  The Fifth Circuit construed 
significantly protectable interest as “a stake in the matter that goes beyond 
a generalized preference that the case come out a certain way” and 
 
178. MALDEF’s first motion to intervene was filed on behalf of a group of seven Latino voters. 
See Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113 (D.D.C. 2012), vacated and remanded on other grounds by 
Texas v. Holder, 570 U.S. 928 (2013). The court granted the motion without any consideration of the 
Rule 24(a)(2) burden, simply stating: “We also grant[] motions to intervene filed by several individual 
Texas voters.” Id. at 119. 
179. Therefore, regardless of whether MALDEF has an interest in the litigation because 
immigration is a “measure it has supported,” MALDEF is not the Proposed Intervenor. See discussion 
in Idaho Farm Bureau Federation v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1995). 
180. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015). 
181. Id. The DAPA program aimed to provide resources to undocumented immigrants who were 
parents of citizens or lawful permanent residents. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., 2014 
EXECUTIVE ACTIONS ON IMMIGRATION (2015). 
182. See Texas I, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591. 
183. Press Release, Mexican Am. Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, MALDEF Seeks to Intervene on 
Behalf of Individuals Affected by the President’s Executive Action on Immigration (Jan. 23, 2015), htt 
p://www.maldef.org/news/releases/maldef_seeks_to_intervene_on_behalf_of_individuals_affected_by
_exec_action_on_immigration/ [https://perma.cc/CD6R-G447]. 
184. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Thomas A. Saenz, MALDEF President). 
185. Order of Intervention at 16, Texas v. United States, No. 15-40333 (5th Cir. Nov. 9, 2015), 
Doc. No. 00513264639. 
186. Id. at 4 (“The States and the Government concede the first and third requirements, but 
argue that the [Proposed Intervenors] do not satisfy the ‘interest’ requirement or the ‘inadequate 












adequacy of representation as a representation where the Proposed 
Intervenors’ “interests diverge from the putative representative’s interests 
in a manner germane to the case.” 187  This interpretation of the Rule 
24(a)(2) burden is in line with other circuits’ gradual loosening of the 
requirements.188  
Still, however, the loosened burden as defined by the Fifth Circuit is 
more akin to the historic amicus role: providing relevant perspective and 
background information to the court that may not exactly match that 
provided by the original parties.189 Especially in Texas I and other social 
justice cases, amicus briefs often supply the same ability to be heard in 
court as intervention, but without any of the doctrinal interferences. This is 
because in social justice cases, the relief is generally the same as that of 
the original parties—to uphold or quash a law.190 
In Lone Star College System v. Immigration Reform Coalition of Texas, 
the University Leadership Initiative (ULI), a student organization at the 
University of Texas at Austin, successfully intervened in an action 
challenging favorable state financial aid legislation for immigrant 
students. 191  The trial court granted ULI intervention on behalf of the 
organization at the Austin campus, as well as on behalf of all 
undocumented immigrant students at any public college or university in 
Texas.192  This included dozens of students attending the University of 
Texas at Austin.193 The court accepted an interest standard of seeking “to 
‘vindicate important rights,’”194 even though words such as “vindicate” 
rang of politico-ideological litigation. Such “lobbying” is more appropriate 
 
187. Id. at 5, 13. 
188. See text accompanying and sources cited supra notes 130–133.  
189. See supra text accompanying note 79. 
190. See GREENBAUM, supra note 16, at 23. 
191. Motion to Intervene, Lone Star Coll. Sys. v. Immigration Reform Coal. of Tex., No. 14-
0031 (Tex. July 1, 2014). Lone Star was filed in the Texas Supreme Court under Texas Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60, but the requirements mimic those of Rule 24 and this Note interprets the case in line 
with Rule 24. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 60; see also Jenkins v. Entergy Corp., 187 S.W.3d 785, 797 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 2006) (“[A] party ‘has a justiciable interest in a lawsuit, and thus a right to intervene, when his 
interests will be affected by the litigation.’” (quoting Jabri v. Alsayyed, 145 S.W.3d 660, 672 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 2004))).  
192. Motion to Intervene Granted, Lone Star Coll. Sys. v. Immigration Reform Coal. of Tex., 
No. 14-0031 (Tex. Aug. 7, 2014); see also University Leadership Initiative, U. TEX. CAMPUS LABS, htt 
ps://utexas.campuslabs.com/engage/organization/ULI [https://perma.cc/W7C9-S5K7]. 
193. Motion to Intervene, Lone Star Coll. Sys. v. Immigration Reform Coal. of Tex. at 4, No. 
14-0031 (Tex. July 1, 2014); Motion to Intervene Granted, Lone Star Coll. Sys. v. Immigration 
Reform Coal. of Tex., No. 14-0031 (Tex. Aug. 7, 2014); see also University Leadership Initiative, 
supra note 192. 
194. Motion to Intervene at 6, Lone Star Coll. Sys. v. Immigration Reform Coal. of Tex., No. 
14-0031 (Tex. July 1, 2014) (quoting In re Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 184 S.W.3d 718, 723–24 (Tex. 
2006)). 











for amicus briefs, in which the judge is assumed to be in an ideological 
vacuum.195 
Similarly, in United States v. California, Proposed Intervenors were 
hundreds of California domestic violence shelters that serve thousands of 
immigrant survivors.196 Proposed Intervenors sought to uphold the validity 
of the California Values Act, which prevents police from aiding the U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement with deportation.197 The Proposed 
Intervenors were granted intervention on a theory that their significantly 
protectable interest was “to express [their] views before the court.”198 
Thus, a court again allowed an interest standard more akin to that of an 
amicus than an intervenor.199  
A recent immigration intervention decision by Judge Hanen, entered on 
May 15, 2018, was in a case also captioned as Texas v. United States 
(Texas II),200 which generated significant and unprecedented support on 
social media. In Texas II, a group of twenty-two Dreamers intervened in a 
lawsuit brought by the State of Texas against the United States seeking an 
accelerated termination of the DACA program.201 
A Facebook post by DACA Time,202 a public interest group unrelated 
to MALDEF that has not intervened itself, publicized the court’s decision 
to grant the twenty-two Dreamers’ intervention motion.203 The post called 
the State of Texas and President Donald Trump part of a “lockstep” to see 
DACA eliminated.204  For these Dreamers, having their views heard in 
 
195. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 80, at 748. 
196. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene of the California Partnership to End 
Domestic Violence and the Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights at 1, United States v. California, 
No. 2:18-cv-00490-JAM-KJN (E.D. Cal. May 4, 2018), ECF No. 73-1. 
197. Id. at 1–2. 
198. Id. at 5 (quoting United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391, 398 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
199. See supra text accompanying note 79. 
200. Telephonic Conference Before the Honorable Andrew S. Hanen, Texas v. United States, 
No. 1:18-CV-00068 (S.D. Tex. May 15, 2018), ECF No. 34. 
201. According to Thomas A. Saenz, MALDEF president and general counsel, “[s]uch a 
collusive lawsuit cannot go forward without intervenors who will actually and vigorously defend the 
critically important initiative.” MALDEF Files Motion to Intervene on Behalf of Dreamers in Texas-
Led Lawsuit Challenging DACA, MEXICAN AM. LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND (May 8, 2018), 
http://www.maldef.org/news/releases/2018_05_08_MALDEF_Files_Motion_to_Intervene_on_Behalf
_of_Dreamers_in_Texas-Led_Lawsuit_Challenging_DACA/ [https://perma.cc/UM3R-9ZFK]. 
Proposed Intervenors’ alleged significantly protectable interest was “loss of authorized presence in the 
U.S., as well as loss of educational and economic opportunities.” Id. Proposed Intervenors alleged 
inadequate representation because “the Trump administration is unlikely and unwilling to adequately 
protect their interests given its public opposition to DACA.” Id. 
202. DACA Time assists immigrants applying for DACA programming. See DACA TIME, https: 
//www.dacatime.com/ [https://perma.cc/H9UL-8F3J]. 
203. DACA Time, Judge Allows Group of “Dreamers” to Formally Fight Texas’ Lawsuit to 
End DACA, FACEBOOK (May 16, 2018), https://www.facebook.com/dacatime/posts/21351724434310 
37 [https://perma.cc/44LC-5H28]. 
204. Id. (quoting Julián Aguilar, Judge Allows Group of “Dreamers” to Formally Fight Texas’ 












court was a critically important way to take a political stance.205 Other 
social media posts on immigration intervention demonstrate political 
activism through hundreds of reactions, comments, and shares.206  Such 
comments call for supporters to “fight for this cause” and “be part of this 
advocacy.”207 Again, these words ring of politico-idealism and lobbying. 
While engaging every interested voice in court is an important public 
policy, amicus briefs, which do not shortchange other doctrines and still 
allow every voice to be heard, provide a more appropriate platform for 
political advocacy. 
B. Government Intervention and Endless, Debate-Style Contentious 
Intervention 
While this Note demonstrates that lowered-burden intervention by 
social justice intervenors has become increasingly political, another 
consideration is the FRCP’s built-in system for government 
intervention.208 Government intervention becomes political no matter who 
is in charge or what the issue is.209 Additionally, as discussed, intervention 
can cut both ways because intervention motions under the lowered burden, 
while more favorable to social justice intervenors, are filed by those 
seeking to quiet social justice actions as well.210 Thus, it is possible to have 
never-ending, back-and-forth contentious intervention motions.211  
In fact, such a situation—where different groups of Proposed 





206. Immigration Voice, FACEBOOK (Dec. 22, 2017), https://www.facebook.com/ImmigrationV 
oice/posts/dear-friendssave-jobs-usa-and-dhs-have-traded-another-set-of-motions-in-the-h4-e/1720291 
198037097/ [https://perma.cc/G7UJ-8E26] (advertising a motion to intervene filed by Immigration 
Voice to uphold the Department of Homeland Security’s new rule allowing spouses of H-1B workers 
(frequently immigrants) to apply for employment authorization). The post, as of September 26, 2018, 
has 353 reactions, 58 comments, and 104 shares. Some of the comments read: “Thank you IV for 
intervening [in] this case, and having our back;” “Thank you immigration voice for the intervention. 
We should do everything to support and fight for this cause;” and “Keep sharing and wake up folks to 
join hands and be part of this advocacy.” Id. 
207. Id. 
208. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(2) (“On timely motion, the court may permit a federal or state 
governmental officer or agency to intervene if a party’s claim or defense is based on: (A) a statute or 
executive order administered by the officer or agency; or (B) any regulation, order, requirement, or 
agreement issued or made under the statute or executive order.”). 
209. See, e.g., Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 787 F.2d 875 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(allowing members of Congress to intervene to defend constitutionality of federal statute). 
210. See sources cited supra note 164. 
211. See White, supra note 19, at 527–28 (noting that public interest litigation, bolstered by 
intervention, leads to a “lawsuit mania”). 











litigation—has occurred many times. 212  These contentious intervention 
motions transform a given litigation into a political debate stage, where 
public interest groups hash out issues such as voting and pollution all 
under the auspices of the federal courts. 213  The lowered burden to 
intervene facilitates this crowding and politicization of intervention. 214 
When contentious intervention motions begin to overshadow the nature of 
the dispute between the original litigants and crowd the litigation stage, it 
is more practical to hear these views through their traditional forum of 
amicus briefs.   
V. BOUNDARIES: WHERE TO DRAW THE LINE WITH INTERVENTION? 
Justice Stewart’s dissent in Cascade both imagined and feared a world 
where “interest” became too malleable a standard for intervention. 215 
Courts’ recent expansion of the significantly protectable interest 
requirement revitalizes concerns about when to limit the scope of the 
interest. Similarly, expansion of the adequacy of representation 
requirement generates concerns regarding when representation in the 
litigation may actually be adequate and intervention is therefore 
unnecessary. By allowing such a low burden for intervention under Rule 
24(a)(2), courts have opened themselves up for dialogue regarding 
ideological, political, and policy questions on the original litigation 
stage.216  These perspectives and questions are important, but are better 
addressed in amicus briefs. There, outsiders to the litigation can provide 
background information to sway the judge, without receiving the status of 
an original litigant or interfering with other doctrines.  
 
212. See, e.g., Feldman v. Ariz. Sec’y of State, 843 F.3d 366 (9th Cir. 2016) (contentious 
intervention motions filed by plaintiff-intervenor Bernie 2016, Inc. and defendant-intervenor The 
Arizona Republican Party over lawsuit by Democratic Party regarding vote collection issue); 
Consolidated Delta Smelt Cases, 717 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (contentious intervention 
motions filed by plaintiff-intervenor Department of Water Resources and defendants-intervenors 
environmental rights groups over laws affecting delta smelt). 
213. See cases cited supra note 212. 
214. See supra note 211. 
215. See Cascade Nat. Gas Corp. v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 147 (1967) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting) (“These general and indefinite interests do not even remotely resemble the direct and 
concrete stake in litigation required for intervention of right.”). 
216. See White, supra note 19, at 553 (“Without a concrete interest, the [Proposed Intervenor] 
would merely be asking the federal courts to do, for the benefit of all citizens, what Congress would 












A. Standing for Intervention Motions in the Wake of Town of Chester 
Prior to the Court’s June 5, 2017 decision in Town of Chester v. Laroe 
Estates,217 there was a decades-long circuit split as to whether a Proposed 
Intervenor did or did not require independent standing along with meeting 
the Rule 24(a)(2) burden.218 After Town of Chester, a third party seeking 
the same relief as an original litigant may intervene as long as there is an 
original litigant with standing.219 With this decision, the Court removed 
standing, a “limiting concept,” from the implicit, or outside of Rule 24, 
burden to intervene for parties seeking the same relief as an original 
litigant.220 The Court additionally created a logical fallacy. As discussed, 
in analyzing intervention motions, courts have observed that “[w]hen the 
party seeking intervention has the same ultimate objective as a party to the 
suit, a presumption arises that its interests are adequately represented.”221 
This, of course, would make it so that any party seeking the same relief as 
an original litigant is likely to fail the interest and adequacy of 
representation prongs of the burden to intervene. Thus, under the Court’s 
new Article III standing standard for intervention, it is nearly impossible 
to intervene. The last time such a logical fallacy was in place with the Rule 
24 burden to intervene, the Advisory Committee had to amend Rule 24.222 
Additionally, by focusing the standing inquiry on whether a Proposed 
Intervenor seeks the same relief as an original litigant, the Court created a 
standard that hearkens back to that of an amicus.223 Amici align with the 
side of the litigation they agree with and provide outside perspectives that 
support that side’s desired relief.224 When the relief sought is simply to 
challenge the validity of a law, as is often the case in public interest 
 
217. 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 (2017). 
218. See Eric S. Oelrich, The Relationship Between Standing and Intervention: The Tenth 
Circuit Answers by “Standing” Down, 14 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 209, 210 n.4 (2006) (“The 
Seventh, Eighth and D.C. Circuits have held that an ‘intervenor must establish its own standing in 
addition to meeting FRCP 24(a)’s interest requirement prior to intervening’ . . . . The Second, Fifth, 
Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have come to the opposite conclusion, and they have all held ‘that a 
party trying to intervene need only meet the Rule 24(a) interest requirement.’” (quoting San Juan Cty. 
v. United States, 420 F.3d 1197, 1204 (10th Cir. 2005))); see also Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 
68 n.21 (1986) (“Compare United States v. 39.36 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855, 859 (CA7 1985) 
(intervention requires an interest in excess of that required for standing) . . . with Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference v. Kelley, 241 U.S.App.D.C. 340, 747 F.2d 777 (1984) (equating interest 
necessary to intervene with interest necessary to confer standing) . . . .”). 
219. Town of Chester, 137 S. Ct. at 1651 (“[A]n intervenor of right must have Article III 
standing in order to pursue relief that is different from that which is sought by a party with standing.”). 
220. See Lowman, supra note 85, at 1251–52. 
221. Virginia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 542 F.2d 214, 216 (4th Cir. 1976). 
222. See text accompanying and sources cited supra note 49. 
223. See supra text accompanying notes 81–83. 
224. See supra text accompanying notes 81–83. 











litigation,225 joining intervenors as original litigants is duplicative, rather 
than efficient. The same goals could be accomplished by providing outside 
perspectives as an amicus. 
Town of Chester was an important decision for social justice 
intervenors. The purpose behind the standing doctrine is to limit the power 
of justiciability226 by ensuring “that there is a specific controversy before 
the court.”227 For this reason, the requirements for Article III standing are 
rigorous. 228  Without standing, the Court fears that “litigious 
intermeddlers” would assert the rights of another and seek relief that the 
latter does not seek herself. 229  In other words, “[a]n interest shared 
generally with the public at large . . . will not do.” 230  Social justice 
intervention after Town of Chester circumvents this very purpose by 
consolidating large portions of the public based solely on the public’s 
shared interests. 
Allowing politico-ideological litigation without standing through the 
backdoor of Rule 24 shortchanges long-standing policies behind the 
standing doctrine. Standing serves to “facilitate judicial efficiency”231 by 
supplying rigorous requirements and ensuring that those who cannot meet 
its requirements do not file “ideological” lawsuits.232 Ideological lawsuits 
would clog federal courts and make it so “their resources would not be 
properly focused on cases where the legal issues are clear and the dispute 
is ripe for resolution.”233 Indeed, as some commentators have noted:  
If courts or litigants could mold the . . . amicus curiae into a vessel 
enabling third parties, lacking the requisite standing, to enter into 
federal courts and directly participate in a given litigation, the 
effects could be far reaching. The . . . amicus would thus become the 
 
225. See text accompanying and sources cited supra notes 16–17. 
226. Expert Report of Neil M. Richards at 26, Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook [2017] IEHC 545 
(H. Ct.) (Ir.) (No. 2016 4809 P), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3120546 
[hereinafter Richards Report]. 
227. See Oelrich, supra note 218, at 214 (quoting ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 61 (2d ed. 2002)). 
228. A plaintiff must show: (1) injury in fact; (2) causation between the injury and the 
defendant’s conduct; and (3) that a favorable federal court decision will redress the injury. See 
Richards Report, supra note 226, at 27. The standing doctrine, however, is a confused one and “many 
commentators believe that the Court has manipulated standing rules based on views of the merits of 
particular cases.” Id. at 28 (quoting ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES § 2.5 (5th ed. 2015)). 
229. See Oelrich, supra note 218, at 214. 
230. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 
64 (1997)).  
231. Id.  
232. Id.  












mystical gateway to the federal judicial system that countless public 
interest attorneys have pursued.234 
In reality, this fear now rings true for intervenors, although the concern 
originated through imagining the possibility of allowing a third party 
without standing to directly participate in a lawsuit under the guise of an 
amicus, who does not need standing.235 This circumvention is even more 
inevitable after Town of Chester. Thus, by removing the standing 
requirement for Proposed Intervenors seeking the same relief as an 
original party, the Court has shortchanged its own policies behind 
standing. By relegating politico-ideological perspectives to amicus briefs, 
where standing is not required, the Court would avoid this problem. 
The Court treaded too far by permitting a Proposed Intervenor without 
independent standing access to the courts and rights equivalent to those of 
an original party, particularly when intervention is on a massive scale. In 
deciding Town of Chester, the Court likely had in mind “the exigencies of 
class litigation,” and a desire to preserve judicial resources and maintain 
fairness by keeping all perspectives packaged in one case.236 However, 
“standing goes to the heart of who does and does not have access to 
federal courts.”237 Particularly when intervention is on a massive scale, 
such as in endless contentious intervention motions within the same suit238 
or in intervention by groups of hundreds of people,239 intervention under 
Rule 24 is a way to skirt both the standing requirements and the class 
action requirements of Rule 23. 240  With today’s increasing litigation, 
particularly class litigation, “federal courts [should] proceed cautiously in 
adjudicating” classes. 241  By maintaining its precedent of reserving 
politico-ideological advocacy for amicus briefs, the Court avoids cutting 
its own other doctrines off at the knees. 
B. Class Intervention, and Subsequent Rule 23 Class Action, Jurisdiction, 
and Res Judicata Concerns 
Given the lowered Rule 24 burden, Proposed Intervenors have 
intervened in an increasing number of politico-ideological contexts and 
 
234. Lowman, supra note 85, at 1281 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
235. See text accompanying and sources cited supra notes 85–86. 
236. Daniel D. DeVougas, Note, Without a Leg to Stand on? Class Representatives, Federal 
Courts, and Standing Desiderata, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 627, 654 (2012) (“Considering that standing 
doctrine is a matter of constitutional significance, federal courts should not be so quick to tamper with 
it to accommodate the exigencies of class litigation.”); see also discussion supra Section II.B. 
237. DeVougas, supra note 236, at 654. 
238. See text accompanying and sources cited supra notes 210–214. 
239. See, e.g., text accompanying and sources cited supra notes 163, 168, 192, 196. 
240. See infra Section V.B. 
241. DeVougas, supra note 236, at 654. 











have packaged an increasing number of intervenors into one motion.242 
This trend, coupled with the removal of an independent Article III 
standing requirement, raises concerns about interference with the doctrines 
of Rule 23 class actions, jurisdiction, and res judicata. Courts should 
tighten the Rule 24 burden and relegate politico-ideological perspectives 
to amicus briefs, particularly when the relief sought is the same as that 
sought by the original litigants. 
1. Class Intervention Concerns 
A massive group of Proposed Intervenors intervening in an ongoing 
litigation is possible under the FRCP. Indeed, this procedural manipulation 
has been used a number of times.243  Motions filed by large groups of 
Proposed Intervenors have been both denied and granted by courts in line 
with the Rule 24(a)(2) burden analysis. 244  Courts have not denied a 
massive scale intervention due to the reasoning that a large intervention 
group is, in substance, a class and therefore procedurally unsound. Along 
the same line, courts have not properly analyzed a large-scale Rule 24 
intervention under the more rigorous Rule 23 class action requirements. 
Indeed, in Bostic v. Schaefer,245 in which intervenors were all Virginia 
same-sex couples challenging the legality of Virginia’s marriage statutes, 
the Fourth Circuit permitted massive-scale intervention explicitly styled as 
a class on a Rule 24 analysis.246 This explicit styling is important because 
typically, large-scale Proposed Intervenors do not style themselves as a 
class, which allows for a more secretive circumvention of the Rule 23 
requirements.247  
After Bostic, intervention styled as a class is not just possible, but 
explicitly permissible in a growing number of courts.248 However, both 
explicitly styled classes of intervenors as well as large groups of 
 
242. See supra Parts III–IV. 
243. See, e.g., text accompanying and sources cited supra notes 150, 168, 176, 192, 196, 200.  
244. See, e.g., In re HealthSouth Corp. Ins. Litig., 219 F.R.D. 688 (N.D. Ala. 2004) (stating no 
misgivings about the possibility of class intervention and instead denying Rule 24 intervention by a 
class on the grounds that their interests were adequately represented by the original parties); Order, 
Akins v. Worley Catastrophe Response, LLC, Civil No. 12-2401, 2014 WL 1456382 (E.D. La. Apr. 
14, 2014) (No. 2:12-cv-2401-JCW), ECF No. 70 (stating no misgivings about the possibility of class 
intervention and instead denying Rule 24 intervention by a class into another class action on the 
significantly protectable interest requirement of Rule 24). 
245. 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014). 
246. Id. at 352 (allowing plaintiff-intervenors to intervene “on behalf of themselves and all 
others similarly situated”). 
247. See, e.g., text accompanying and sources cited supra notes 150, 168, 176, 192, 196, 200. 
248. See, e.g., Tech. Training Assocs. v. Buccaneers Ltd. P’ship, 874 F.3d 692 (11th Cir. 2017) 













intervenors without class action stylization call into question all of the 
requirements of Rule 23: numerosity, commonality, typicality, and 
adequate representation. 249  Recently, the Court has demonstrated its 
unwillingness to certify classes that are too “unwieldy.”250 In light of the 
more rigorous standard imposed by the Court in Wal-Mart Stores v. 
Dukes, 251  one of “affirmative[] . . . compliance” with Rule 23’s 
requirements, attorneys will bring fewer class actions due to the amount of 
resources required to support the high evidentiary burden.252 Therefore, 
since an intervention class that actually represents itself as a class can 
intervene, groups of intervenors can consolidate—and have done so—into 
groups of hundreds of people253  and effectively act as a class without 
having to satisfy the stringent Rule 23 requirements.  
But, if the whole point of intervention is to intervene when the parties 
to the litigation do not adequately represent the Proposed Intervenors, a 
class action of intervenors becomes duplicative. To be certified as a Rule 
23 class action, a class must already satisfy the adequacy of representation 
requirement.254 In that respect, it makes more sense for large groups of 
intervenors to file a separate action.255 However, an independent class then 
runs into standing issues because Town of Chester only removed an 
independent standing requirement for Proposed Intervenors.256 Intervenor 
classes may choose to consolidate and use Rule 24 to get into court 
because they cannot satisfy one or both of the more stringent Rule 23 class 
action and Article III standing requirements.257 Again, when a large group 
of public interest advocates cannot meet these rigorous requirements, 
 
249. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
250. John M. Husband & Bradford J. Williams, Wal-Mart v. Dukes Redux: The Future of the 
Sprawling Class Action, COLO. LAW., Sept. 2011, at 53, 53 (discussing the decision in Wal-Mart 
Stores v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011)). 
251. 564 U.S. at 350. 
252. Id.; Husband & Williams, supra note 250, at 55. 
253. See, e.g., text accompanying and sources cited supra notes 150, 168, 176, 192, 196. 
254. See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 349 n.5 (“[T]he commonality and typicality requirements of 
Rule 23(a) tend to merge. Both serve as guideposts for determining whether under the particular 
circumstances maintenance of a class action is economical and whether the named plaintiff’s claim 
and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class members will be fairly and 
adequately protected in their absence. Those requirements therefore also tend to merge with the 
adequacy-of-representation requirement . . . .” (emphasis added) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 
U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982))). Rule 23, like Rule 24, implicitly carries concerns about res judicata. Id. at 
363. 
255. The result of allowing an intervention class to intervene is a dual adequacy of 
representation inquiry. Douglas M. Towns, Merit-Based Class Action Certification: Old Wine in a 
New Bottle, 78 VA. L. REV. 1001, 1005 n.20 (1992) (citing Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 
239, 247 (3d Cir. 1975)). First, the court must inquire into adequacy of the leader of the class as a class 
action leader. Id. Second, the court must inquire into adequacy of the representation of an original 
party in the litigation into which intervention is sought. Id. 
256. See supra text accompanying note 219. 
257. See text accompanying and sources cited supra notes 228, 249. 











which were put in place to weed out cases lacking an actual controversy, 
the underlying basis of the lawsuit is likely politico-ideological and better 
suited for an amicus brief.258 
When a group of Proposed Intervenors cannot satisfy Rule 23 or Article 
III standing, and their only recourse is to intervene, they are “asking the 
federal courts to do, for the benefit of all citizens, what Congress would 
not do legislatively.”259 Now that Rule 24 is not only being used in an 
increasingly political and ideological context, but also on a massive class-
sized scale, courts should tighten the burden on both significantly 
protectable interest and adequacy of representation.  
2. Jurisdictional Concerns 
An intervenor class could also lead to jurisdictional issues. In cases 
such as Cascade, where the claim was inherently jurisdiction-dependent as 
it dealt with monopolies in the California natural gas industry, 260 
jurisdiction may not be as much of an issue.261 However, “in cases where 
jurisdiction depends on factors other than the very nature of the claim, the 
jurisdictional requirements may require a court to draw the line 
somewhere on parties seeking to intervene. ‘It is not always easy to draw 
th[at] line.’”262 Indeed, part of the reason the Court tightened the Rule 23 
requirements in Wal-Mart was because the proposed class worked at over 
three thousand stores throughout the United States.263 The Court’s denial 
of class certification turned on the commonality requirement, and the fact 
that practices between stores in different states were too different to 
support a common question of law or fact.264 Rule 24 intervention that 
draws together Proposed Intervenors from various states would 
circumvent these concerns. 
Perhaps since class-action styled intervention motions so far have been 
contained within one state, intervenor classes could satisfy the more 
stringent Rule 23 requirements. By way of example, the intervenors in 
Amazon.com LLC v. Lay 265  were all North Carolina residents, the 
 
258. See discussion of standing after Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 
(2017), supra Section V.A; see also text accompanying and sources cited supra notes 85–86, 231–235.  
259. See White, supra note 19, at 553. On the other hand, the Advisory Committee has seen 
intervention repeatedly being granted and could always amend Rule 24 to tighten the burden. This may 
raise issues of institutional competence. 
260. Cascade Nat. Gas Corp. v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 134 (1967). 
261. See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 690 F.2d 1203, 1210 n.5 
(5th Cir. 1982). 
262. Id. (quoting Cascade, 386 U.S. at 134). 
263. Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 358 (2011).  
264. Id. at 358–59; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 












intervenors in Texas II266 and Lone Star College System v. Immigration 
Reform Coalition267 were all Texas Dreamers or Texas college students, 
and the intervenors in Bostic v. Schaefer268 were all Virginia residents. The 
crux of the concern could arise when, for example, a Dreamer seeks 
intervention on behalf of all Dreamers everywhere, rather than containing 
the group intervention within one state. However, even if such classes are 
filed under Rule 23 and meet the stringent Rule 23 requirements, they 
could still fail for want of Article III standing if the proffered injury is 
determined to be too ideological in nature and not sufficiently concrete.269 
But, because they are filed under Rule 24, Rule 23 is not an issue, and 
standing is no longer an issue after Town of Chester if the relief sought is 
the same as that of the original litigants. Therefore, the best way to avoid 
interfering with these doctrines is for courts to tighten the Rule 24 burden 
to protect against politico-ideological litigation. These matters are better 
suited for amicus briefs.  
3. Res Judicata Concerns 
Jurisdictional limits still do not solve res judicata issues for class-styled 
or class-like intervention. Even if a Proposed Intervenor is in the same 
state as other Proposed Intervenors and the litigation, she may not learn 
about a pending class action—let alone a pending class intervention 
action—that affects her rights. Federal courts “have a unique 
responsibility . . . . [to] reduce the dynamics that threaten vulnerable 
absent class members.”270 After all, it was concern about res judicata and 
quieting title to real property that drove the creation of Rule 24 in the first 
place.271 Because courts have construed Rule 24(a)(2) so far away from its 
original purpose, even in light of the 1966 Amendment, it now stands to 
open the door for res judicata issues it never anticipated. This is 
particularly so in light of courts’ willingness to grant massive scale and 
even explicitly class-styled intervention.272  
 
266. Aguilar, supra note 2; see also supra text accompanying note 200.  
267. See supra text accompanying note 191. 
268. See supra text accompanying note 245. 
269. See discussion of the policies behind a rigorous standing doctrine, supra Section V.A. 
270. Andrew S. Weinstein, Avoiding the Race to Res Judicata: Federal Antisuit Injunctions of 
Competing State Class Actions, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1085, 1086 (2000). 
271. See supra text accompanying note 35. 
272. See, e.g., text accompanying and sources cited supra notes 150, 168, 176, 192, 196, 200, 
245. 











Additionally, some courts interpret a party’s interest in intervening in 
terms of a mere stare decisis273 effect on that party’s rights, rather than the 
more rigid cause-of-action-based res judicata. 274  When combined with 
class intervention, this is problematic. If untethered class-styled 
intervention under Rule 24 is permitted using an interest standard of stare 
decisis, or an interest in generally seeing a case come out a certain way for 
precedent-setting purposes, the scope of how many Proposed Intervenors 
are covered is functionally boundless. This would make delivering notice 
of an intervention motion to the full class under principles of res judicata 
nearly impossible.275  
By way of example, imagine an intervention motion is filed on behalf 
of all Dreamers everywhere in the United States. A court permits the 
whole class to intervene under Rule 24 using a stare decisis interest 
standard.276 Likely every Dreamer has an interest in seeing precedent set in 
their favor. With 3.6 million Dreamers living in the United States, 277 
delivering notice of a suit that may affect this interest becomes 
unworkable. Courts should be concerned about res judicata issues for 
absentees who are unaware that they are being represented in an 
intervention action. The best way to solve these concerns is for courts to 
tighten the Rule 24(a)(2) burden. Such politico-ideological advocacy is 
better suited for amicus briefs, where standing as an original litigant and 
issues of representation in class actions, jurisdiction, and notice are not an 
issue. 
CONCLUSION 
Intervention under Rule 24 has been judicially construed in light of the 
1966 Amendment to a loose burden far and away from its real-property-
based origins. Recently, Rule 24 has been used in socially conscious ways 
 
273. See Stare Decisis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The doctrine of precedent, 
under which a court must follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in 
litigation.”). 
274. See WildEarth Guardians v. Nat’l Park Serv., 604 F.3d 1192, 1199 (10th Cir. 2010) (“In 
fact, for purposes of Rule 24(a)(2), sufficient impairment may result even from the ‘stare decisis 
effect’ of a district court’s judgment. . . . ‘We may consider any significant legal effect in the 
applicant’s interest and we are not restricted to a rigid res judicata test.’” (first quoting Utahns for 
Better Transp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 295 F.3d 1111, 1116 (10th Cir. 2002); and then quoting Coal. 
of Ariz./N.M. Ctys. for Stable Econ. Growth v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 100 F.3d 837, 844 (10th Cir. 
1996))). 
275. This is precisely why Rule 23 has a strict notice requirement for class members. See FED. 
R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2). 
276. See text accompanying and sources cited supra note 273. 
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to advance politico-ideological views about immigration and other 
important public interest issues. Following the Court’s decision in Town of 
Chester, intervenors who seek the same relief as an original litigant, a 
requirement that is easily satisfied in social justice cases, do not have to 
establish independent Article III standing and are thus treated as original 
litigants who may directly participate in a given litigation. This expansion 
has led to massive scale intervention. Massive scale intervention has 
occurred both through endless, debate-style filings of contentious 
intervention motions that crowd the stage of the original litigation, as well 
as through intervention by groups of hundreds of people, sometimes even 
styled as a class action of intervenors. Allowing standing and class action 
grouping through the backdoor of Rule 24 shortchanges and cuts the 
Court’s other long-standing doctrines off at the knees. 
If Rule 24 is left untethered, it will continue to interfere with the 
carefully crafted requirements of Article III standing and Rule 23 class 
actions. Should Rule 24 expand extra-jurisdictionally, additional res 
judicata and notice issues will arise. Rule 24 has been and will continue to 
be abused by politicians, special interest groups, and individual third 
parties on both sides of the political aisle. These perspectives are 
important, but are better suited for their traditional forum of amicus briefs. 
Courts should tighten the Rule 24 “significantly protectable interest” and 
“adequacy of representation” burden to intervene, and return politico-
ideological perspectives on a given litigation to where they have 
traditionally thrived: in amicus briefs. 
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